預(yù)算軟約束下金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)對企業(yè)投資效率影響——基于中國國有上市公司的實證研究

摘要： 本文以2007-2011年的國有上市公司為研究對象,通過運(yùn)用博弈論分析和實證研究的方法,考察了預(yù)算軟約束、金字塔結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)投資效率的相互關(guān)系。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在預(yù)算軟約束下,金字塔持股結(jié)構(gòu)中最終控制人的控制權(quán)比例、所有權(quán)比例以及控制權(quán)和所有權(quán)的分離程度均對企業(yè)的投資效率產(chǎn)生了重要的影響。依據(jù)研究結(jié)果,本文從國有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)管體制、國有資本經(jīng)營預(yù)算等方面提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議。
This paper studies the relationship among soft budget constraint,pyramid structure and company's investment efficiency based on the data of A-share state-owned listed companies from 2007-2011 through game theory and empirical research method.The research finds that the proportion of control right and ownership for ultimate controller in the pyramid structure and the degree of separation between control right and ownership exert significant influence on company's investment efficiency under soft budget constraint.According to this result,the paper brings forward suggestions on state-owned assets supervision system and state-owned capital operating budget.