策略延遲下眾籌項目的定價和激勵決策

摘要： 本文研究了投資者的策略延遲行為對眾籌項目的定價以及激勵決策的影響。策略延遲是指投資者在投資過程中自動按照估值在相應(yīng)階段投資,并且部分投資者會刻意延遲投資來搭便車的行為。本文采用了一個兩階段模型來刻畫投資者的投資行為,并進一步對比序列到來模式(投資者沒有策略延遲)與同時到來模式(投資者有策略延遲)中的貝葉斯均衡。研究結(jié)果表明,當(dāng)發(fā)起人采用價格激勵的方式提高成功率時,投資者的策略延遲行為可能會影響最優(yōu)的激勵策略。當(dāng)存在固定目標約束時,如果投資者沒有策略延遲行為,發(fā)起人應(yīng)該激勵前期投資者,通過彌補他們等待成本的方式提高成功率;反之如果投資者出現(xiàn)策略延遲行為,對項目估值較高的投資者會自動在前期投資并且愿意承受更高的價格,此時發(fā)起人應(yīng)該反過來激勵后期投資者。當(dāng)不存在目標約束時,不論投資者是否有策略延遲行為,發(fā)起人都應(yīng)該始終激勵前期投資者以獲得更高的成功率以及期望收益。
With the dramatic growth of crowdfunding industry which have provided entrepreneurs a new way of financing,more and more issues have been studied to improve the success rates of crowdfunding projects.To motivate more early investors to pledge in the project,entrepreneurs are often encouraged to motivate early investors.Inspired by practical problems,this paper considers the strategic delay behaviors of investors and their influences on the pricing and incentive strategies in crowdfunding projects.Strategic delay behaviors make investors spontaneously invest in correspondingly period according to their valuations during the investing process.In addition,some early investors may deliberately delay their investment for free-riding because the risks and the waiting cost are both higher in the early stage of crowdfunding.The free-riding behavior will worsen the performance of projects in early stage and decrease the overall success rate.A two-period model is adopted to depict the investing behaviors of investors and compared the Bayesian equilibriums in the sequential model(no strategic delay)with the spontaneous model(with strategic delay),respectively.To depict the crowdfunding process,I_1 and I_2 are used to denote the investors arriving in two periods and useδto denote the waiting cost of early investor.Therefore,the pledging probabilities of two investors q_1 and q_2 are concluded,as well as the success rate S=q_1×q_2.The strategic behaviors in our model is considered by allowing investors to choose the entry time spontaneously.By comparing the success rates in different scenarios and adjusting the prices pifor different investors,the optimal pricing strategies in many occasions can be concluded.Our results show that the waiting cost of early investor induces the strategic delay behaviors.Moreover,the strategic delay behaviors of investors could influence the optimal incentive decisions when entrepreneurs choose to improve success rates with price discrimination.When there exists the constraint of fixed target,if the investors can't strategic delay,the entrepreneur should motivate the early investors and improve the success rate through making up their waiting cost.In contrast,when the investors can strategic delay,investors with high valuations will spontaneously invest in the early period and are willing to take the higher price,therefore the entrepreneur should motivate the late investors instead.When there is no target constraint,the entrepreneur should motivate the early investors for higher success rate and expected profit no matter if the investors strategic delay.In conclusion,the managerial guidance is provided for entrepreneurs on improving the projects according to the targets and the behaviors of investors.In addition,the practical value of our conclusions is tested by providing realistic examples and empirical studies,including 575 projects on one of the largest crowdfunding platforms in China.Our limitation and future goals which provide more directions and inspirations for relevant research in the future are also stated.